This is your brain on drugs
One morning last summer, in the midst of my research, a
longtime colleague and friend showed up at my office door
looking a bit out of sorts.
“Something's really wrong with my dad,” he said.
“He's not himself.”
Having spent time with my friend's father over the years, I
was well aware of the twenty-year battle with Parkinson's
disease that had slowly eroded the dexterity and agility of this
successful trial lawyer and former athlete. And I had more than
once seen the look, somewhere between pain and confusion, that
engulfed my friend's face when the disease suddenly took a turn
for the worse. But today there was something different.
“What do you mean?” I asked. “Is it the
Parkinson's?”
“Sort of,” he replied. “Somehow his
medication has gotten out of whack. He's doing the most bizarre
things. Late last night, my brother found him standing in the
front yard with a water pistol in his hand. He was convinced
that he was protecting the house from a gang of
marauders.”
“In Omaha?”
A smile momentarily broke his sobriety. “Yes. And when
my brother found him, all he said was, 'It's about time you got
here. I need some backup.'”
“How is he now?” I asked.
“They've got him in the hospital, and they're
monitoring his medication, trying to figure out what went wrong.
They have to keep him under constant supervision because
whenever the nurse leaves the room, he tries to make a break for
it.” He paused for a moment. “It just seems so
delicate. What does it mean that the person you thought you knew
can change so dramatically simply because their brain chemistry
changes? What does that say about who we are?”
The relationship between brain chemistry and consciousness
is one that, in the neuroscience age, is hard to get away from.
As neurobiologists have deepened our understanding of the
powerful neurochemicals that underlie our moods and motivations,
words like adrenaline, endorphins, dopamine, and serotonin have
become part of our vernacular. And for those who have spent any
time studying the field, it has become increasingly difficult
not to think of human behavior in chemical terms. In his 2004
book Mind Wide Open: Your Brain and the Neuroscience of
Everyday Life, journalist Steven Johnson sums up the
prevailing view: “Our personalities—the entities
that make us both unique and predictable as
individuals—emerge out of these patterns of chemical
release.” Although part of the widespread confidence
behind this view comes from observing cases like my friend's
father, where a sudden chemical imbalance can cause a severe
psychological disturbance, more of it has come from observations
of the overwhelmingly positive transformations that attaining
the right internal chemistry can bring about. Ever since the
psychopharmacology revolution of the 1950s, when psychiatrists
discovered the power of Thorazine to reduce even the worst
symptoms of psychosis, the quest to chemically engineer mental
health and well-being has been in full swing. Of course, most of
us need look no further than our last trip to Starbucks or the
local pub to see our own conviction in the benefits of
chemically altered consciousness. But what if our power to
chemically transform our experience went beyond a temporary
release of inhibition or elevation of awareness? What if you
could take a regular pill that would radically transform your
personality, and even your sense of self, for the better? In the
brave new world of psychopharmacology, even this bizarre
possibility has become a reality.
We all probably know Prozac as the first and still most
popular of the new genre of antidepressant medications to have
swept the civilized world over the past two decades. By
inhibiting the cellular reuptake of serotonin, this magic pill
has proven overwhelmingly successful in lifting the spirits not
only of the clinically depressed but of anyone simply wishing to
feel a bit “better than well.” While this latter
use, dubbed “cosmetic psychopharmacology” by
psychiatrist Peter Kramer, raises many ethical issues and has
been the subject of much heated debate, it is the results from
Prozac's original clinical application that are of greatest
interest here.
In his 1993 bestseller, Listening to Prozac, Kramer
documents the cases of several patients who, after being
prescribed the medication, experienced not only the expected
elevation in mood but a wholesale transformation of their
personalities. One such case was a woman named Tess who, in
addition to being relieved from her depression, reported being
simultaneously more at ease and more driven, less subject to
emotional disturbance, and more extroverted, socially adept, and
competent at her work. Two weeks after starting the medication,
Kramer writes:
She looked different, at once more relaxed and
energetic—more available—than I had seen her, as if
the person hinted at in her eyes had taken over. She laughed
more frequently, and the quality of her laughter was different,
no longer measured but lively, even teasing.
With this new demeanor came a new social life, one
that did not unfold slowly, as a result of a struggle to
integrate disparate parts of the self, but seemed, rather, to
appear instantly and full-blown.
“Three dates a weekend,” Tess told me.
“I must be wearing a sign on my forehead!”
This new personality remained consistent for nine
months—until Kramer took her off the medication. Although
Tess did initially manage to hold on to some of her newfound
confidence, she gradually began falling back into the
personality traits that had characterized her life before
Prozac. “I'm not myself,” she told Kramer after
several months, at which point he promptly put her back on the
medication.
Another patient, Julia, had experienced a similar
transformation, following a stunning reversal of the
obsessive-compulsive behavior that had been ravaging her family
and work life. But when Kramer tried to lower the dose:
Two weeks later Julia called to say the bottom had
fallen out: “I'm a witch again.” She felt
lousy—pessimistic, angry, demanding. She was up half the
night cleaning. . . . “It's not just my
imagination,” she insisted, and then she used the very
words Tess had used: “I don't feel myself.”
In reflecting on Kramer's accounts, Walter Truett
Anderson writes in The Future of the Self, “What
is particularly fascinating here is that in both cases, the
women believed their 'real selves' to be what they had
experienced during the short period of treatment and not the way
they had been for the rest of their lives. Which, then, is the
real self? And who decides?” Kramer himself, perhaps the
single greatest advocate of cosmetic psychopharmacology, also
found it hard to come to terms with this particular outcome of
the treatment. “How were we to reconcile what Prozac did
for Tess with our notion of the continuous, autobiographical
human self?” These are big questions. And in light of the
present inquiry, I would add one more: If a simple shift in
brain chemistry can bring about such a dramatic transformation
of the self, what aspects of our selves, or souls, do we imagine
are outside the control of the brain? Like the study of brain
damage, psychopharmacology also seems to suggest that we are
more a product of our brains than most of us would like to
think.
Neuroethics
If the study of brain damage and neurochemistry provides the
beginnings of an outline of the profound link between brain and
mind, powerful new brain scanning techniques promise to fill out
the details in living color. By providing a picture of the
brain's blood-flow patterns when engaged in particular
activities, PET, SPECT, and fMRI scans are enabling researchers
to map the regions of the brain like cartographers once charted
the contours of the globe.
Through extensive imaging studies, neuroscientists have been
able to identify nearly a dozen areas involved in different
aspects of speech alone. And that pales in comparison to the
thirty-plus different areas involved in specific aspects of
vision. There is one area that recognizes vertical lines,
another for horizontal lines, another for detecting motion, and
another for the color blue. When it comes to face recognition,
the picture gets even more complex. Would you believe that there
are specific clusters of neurons that light up when presented
with specific faces at specific angles—that, for instance,
there is one tiny part of your brain dedicated specifically to
your grandmother's profile, and another reserved for the
ubiquitous mug of George Bush?
Discovering the biological basis of speech and perception
is, however, just the beginning. With experimental methodologies
improving by the month, even the more complex aspects of our
experience, such as emotion, reason, motivation, and will, are
beginning to give up their secrets. In Mapping the Mind,
science journalist Rita Carter writes: “It is now
possible to locate and observe the mechanics of rage, violence,
and misperception, and even to detect the physical signs of
complex qualities of mind like kindness, humour, heartlessness,
gregariousness, altruism, mother-love, and
self-awareness.”
The profound implications of these findings are not lost on
the neuroscience community. Indeed, one of the more interesting
new areas of discussion is what has become known as neuroethics.
According to psychologist Martha Farah, brain imaging in
particular has opened up an ethical can of worms with its
unprecedented ability to peer into the previously private
reaches of the individual mind. For instance, with neuroimaging,
it has now become possible to tell when someone is being
deceitful, or even when they are deceiving themselves. Enter
lie-detection 3.0. Scientists can also discern whether someone
was involved in a crime by showing them objects from the crime
scene and seeing how their brain responds. Welcome to the new
forensics, as marketed by Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories,
Inc. It's even possible to tell whether someone is an illegal
drug user by showing them photos of drug paraphernalia and
seeing whether the brain enters a “craving state.”
Meet the new war on drugs.
Then there is what Farah refers to as
“brainotyping.” Using these same methodologies,
neuroscientists can now look behind the scenes of your persona
and find out what sort of human being you really are. Do you
secretly harbor racial prejudices? By watching your brain while
you look at pictures of racially diverse faces, brain scanners
can provide an answer. How about sexual preferences? By showing
you a variety of erotic imagery, we can see who or what turns
you (or your brain) on. (And don't bother trying to suppress
your response. Your brain looks different when you do that too.)
Are you a risk-taker? A pessimist? An introvert? Neurotic?
Persistent? Empathic? Even such core personality traits as these
are now laid bare before the new neurointerrogation.
Ethical issues indeed.
Within the discussion around neuroethics, however, there is
a larger issue coming to the fore that some feel may rattle the
very foundations of the way we think about ethics itself. In
civilized culture, our ethical norms and even our legal system
are built on the notion of individual responsibility. When
judging the actions of another, we hold him or her accountable
for having freely chosen those actions for good or ill. But if
we look at the picture of the human being emerging from
neuroscience, many feel that there is little in it to support
the idea that we freely choose our actions. If our actions are
entirely caused by the brain, and the brain is in turn shaped
entirely by the interaction between genes and environment, where
does free will enter the equation? This may seem like
philosophical nonsense, given that one of our most basic human
intuitions is our sense of our own freedom to choose. But
prominent neuroscientists claim that this deterministic picture
of human behavior has, in fact, been reinforced by a number of
experiments that seem to show that our brain makes choices
before we are conscious of having made them, that in fact,
conscious will is an illusion.
This bizarre notion, which is widely held within the
neuroscience community, is clearly not one that will go over
easily with the public at large. In fact, on the controversy
scale, it may run a close second to what is no doubt going to be
the most hotly disputed neuroscience claim of all—the
notion that, as Farah puts it, even our “sense of
spirituality” is itself a “physical function of the
brain.”